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Abstract
The high rate of trade union membership in Nordic countries is often attributed to the
way in which unemployment insurance is organised: that is, as a voluntary scheme which
is administered by trade union-linked funds (the so-called Ghent system). However, since
trade unions and unemployment insurance funds are formally independent from each other,
and alternatives to traditional trade union-linked unemployment funds are available, it is
far from clear why the more expensive option of a dual membership in trade union and
unemployment insurance is generally favoured. Comparing current characteristics and the
operation of the Ghent system in Denmark and Sweden, the article identifies incentives for
joining an unemployment insurance fund per se and, secondly, factors which make such a dual
membership appealing. It shows that some of these apply to both countries, such as the strong
identification with trade unions or the lack of a transparent institutional separation, while
others are country-specific, such as job search support in Denmark and access to improved
benefit provision in Sweden.
Introduction1
Unlike other branches of social insurance (industrial accident, pensions, health)
the nature of the risk of unemployment hampered the earlier and more
comprehensive introduction of public unemployment insurance. At the end of
the nineteenth and long into the twentieth century, political elites and employers
regarded more than a meagre means-tested public support for jobless workers
as potentially raising reservation wages and thus distorting the supply of labour.
Trade unions, for their part, offered voluntary unemployment cover and benefits
tounemployedmembers as awayof resistingdownwardpressure onwages during
times of recession.Maintaining unemployment funds allowed them some control
over the level of wages, and the types of jobs unemployed benefit recipients
were deemed to accept or permitted to turn down without loss of entitlement.
Moreover, the prospect of unemployment benefit was a selective incentive for
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employees to join a trade union, and for trade unions to retain members during
times of economic downturn (Rothstein, 1992; Scruggs and Lange, 2001).
However, the disadvantages and limitations of purely trade union-run
systemsbecame increasingly visible in the 1920s.Membershipwasoftenaffordable
for better-paid skilled workers only, leaving a majority of unskilled labourers
without unemployment cover. Mass and prolonged unemployment during the
interwar years swelled the number of benefit claimants and quickly drained
union funds. Hence, demands grew for a stronger state involvement in the
provision, or at least the funding, of unemployment insurance. The models
adopted during the first two decades of the last century consisted of either the
so-called Ghent system (that is, public subsidies to voluntary trade union-run
systems), named after the Belgian town in which it was first introduced in 1901, or
compulsory state schemes. In the 1920s, the former was themore prevalentmodel
in Europe, adopted in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and the
Nordic countries. However, after World War II most of these countries replaced
the Ghent systemwith compulsory unemployment insurance, which had already
been introduced in Britain, Austria, Italy and Germany. In contemporary mature
welfare states, membership in unemployment insurance is mandatory for the
large majority of employees, and national schemes are run solely by the state,
as in the UK, or in cooperation with social partners. Voluntary unemployment
insurance administered by trade union-linked funds survived only in Denmark,
Sweden and Finland.2
This is not the place to discuss reasons for the shift from the Ghent model
to mandatory unemployment insurance (on this see Viebrock, 2004). Suffice
to note that even in the three countries which retained the Ghent model,
some characteristics of voluntary insurance have considerably changed. Most
importantly, modern unemployment insurance funds are no longer run by trade
unions but by agencies linked to but separate from trade unions, and funds are
supervised by the state. Moreover, the requirement of a dual membership was
abolished, enabling prospective members to join an unemployment insurance
system without having to join a trade union at the same time.
In spite of initial anxieties on the part of national labour movements, this
weakening of control over unemployment insurance has not led to a decline
of trade union membership in the three Ghent countries. Instead, trade union
density rates in Finland, Sweden andDenmark are distinctively high (see Table 1).
Moreover, apart from a slight decline in Denmark in recent years, the Ghent
countries have withstood the general trend of a diminishing relevance of trade
unions elsewhere in Europe (see also Kjellberg, 2006). The figures for Norway
in Table 1 suggest that high trade union membership is not simply a general
trait of Nordic welfare states. Instead, the table underlines the apparently positive
impact of voluntary unemployment insurance on the organisational strength of
trade unions. It is thus unsurprising that social democratic parties in Nordic
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TABLE 1. Union density rates (adjusted data) for selected countries
1970 1980 1990 2000 2003
Denmark 60.3 78.6 75.3 73.3 70.4
Finland 51.3 69.4 72.5 75.0 74.1
Sweden 67.7 78.0 80.8 79.1 78.0
Germany 32.0 34.9 31.2 25.0 22.6
Norway 56.8 58.3 58.5 53.7 53.3
UK 44.8 50.7 39.3 29.7 29.3
Source: Visser (2006: 45).
countries have supported this model, while centre-right and liberal governments
have repeatedly tried to restructure or even replace it with compulsory public
unemployment insurance.
In comparative social policy and industrial relations research, the link
between unemployment insurance and cross-national differences in trade union
density has been a topic of analysis for some time (for example, Neumann
et al., 1991; Rothstein, 1992; Western, 1993; Leonardi, 2006). And yet, beyond
general references, there is a lack of systematic investigation into the ways in
which formally independent unemployment insurance systems might create
recruitment effects for trade unions, and even fewer comparative analyses
that suggest possible country-specific factors. Based on qualitative research
and expert interviews, this article addresses this issue with reference to the
operation of unemployment insurance in Denmark and Sweden. The following
section covers relevant theoretical aspects and reviews the evidence of the link
between voluntary insurance and trade union membership. Subsequently we
contrast major institutional features (organisation, funding, benefit provision)
in the two countries under investigation. We then identify four common and
country-specific factors that make a dual membership (unemployment fund and
trade union) appealing. The concluding part reflects on possible trajectories
of voluntary unemployment insurance systems in the light of policy debates in
Denmark and legislative changes introduced by the new centre-right government
in Sweden in early 2007.
Voluntary unemployment insurance and trade union membership
In line with Olson’s (1965) theory of selective incentives, it is no surprise that
countries in which unemployment insurance is voluntary and run by trade
unions have higher levels of trade union membership than countries with a
compulsory public system (see Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999, 2000). The absence
of a compulsory state scheme and the availability of voluntary unemployment
insurance organised by trade unions offers selective incentives, which help to
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overcome the ‘free-rider’ problem. Unlike wage bargaining, which works to the
advantage of all workers within a particular industry or region, unemployment
insurance restricts benefits to members only (Olson, 1965). In addition, it helps
to maintain links between trade unions and workers who are temporarily out
of work. Of course, there are likely other reasons for the high and stable level
of trade union representation in Nordic countries, such as union access rights
in the workplace, connections with strong social democratic parties or labour
market centralisation. However, the Ghent system of unemployment insurance
is generally assumed to have played at least an important contributory role for
the organisational strength of Danish and Swedish trade unions in the post-war
period (see, for example, Rothstein, 1992).
Several quantitative comparative studies have provided empirical support
for this assumption. Employing a range of statistical tests, Western (1993, 1997)
found that the existence of the Ghent system had a positive effect on trade
union density during the period 1950 to 1985. The impact was particularly
pronounced at times of rising unemployment. In countries with a compulsory
public system, unemployed persons tended to terminate or suspend their
trade union membership. In contrast, both unemployed and employed persons
in Ghent countries remained members of, or increasingly joined, voluntary
unemployment systems at times of economic downturn (see also Scruggs, 2002).
Job starters, too, were more willing to join a trade union in countries with
voluntary unemployment insurance than in countries with a compulsory public
system.
The case of Norway, as a country in which trade union membership is
high by international standards but significantly below the rates found in the
other three Nordic countries (see Table 1), might be regarded as an indication
of the relative impact of the Ghent system (Albrechtsen, 2004). Similarly, trade
union density in Belgium, a country with compulsory unemployment insurance
but a strong trade union role influence in this domain, is higher than in the
Netherlands, even though the two countries are similar in many other relevant
political and sociological aspects (Crouch, 2000). Supported by recent time series
analyses, Scruggs (2002) found a clear positive impact of the Ghent system on
membership trends in the past three decades. Other authors, however, have
raised doubts as to whether differences in trade union membership can solely
be attributable to the presence or absence of the Ghent system (Shalev, 2007).
Comparative investigations into historical developments of trade unionism in
the post-World War II era point to high employment in Ghent countries as an
important factor, as well as the strength of local trade union representation and
their presence at the workplace (Hancke´, 1993). Moreover, a theoretical puzzle
remains. While it is plausible that during times of economic uncertainty, the
membership of voluntary unemployment insurance funds increases, it is less clear
why trade unionmembership rates rise at the same time. After all, unemployment
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insurance funds have been formally independent from trade unions for several
decades. In addition, legal barriers as well as financial disincentives, which
previously disadvantaged employees who joined unemployment insurance funds
withoutbecominga tradeunionmember, have longbeen removedor significantly
weakened (see below).
The above studies offer some speculation on this point. Scruggs (2002)
suggests that despite formal independence, trade unions might influence jobs
offered by insurance funds to individual unemployed persons, or the type of
jobs that are deemed suitable. Thus, unemployment insurance funds might
discriminate in favour of union members (or might at least be perceived that
they do so), not necessarily by altering rules of eligibility, but in the day-to-
day administration of the programme. If there is a higher probability of being
declared eligible for benefits, or of being offered more desirable employment,
individuals might be inclined to join a trade union in order to be in the ‘insider’
job queue (Scruggs, 2002: 292). A dual membership might thus be preferable to
the optionof only joining anunemployment insurance fund, especially at times of
high unemployment. However, the mainly quantitative literature does not allow
inferences about the validity of such assumptions, or about the mechanisms that
might lead to actual or perceived preferential treatment in favour of job seekers
who are also trade union members. The remainder of this article aims to identify
such mechanisms.
Comparing voluntary unemployment insurance in Denmark and
Sweden
One reason for modern welfare states to run mandatory rather than voluntary
unemployment insurance is the problem of adverse selection. The extension
of membership to employees who have a relatively low risk of unemployment
is not only a question of social solidarity but financial viability. Voluntary
unemployment insurance funds face the problem of ‘good risks’ declining to
join, thus requiring membership fees to rise, which, in turn, decreases financial
incentives to enter the scheme even more. These theoretical considerations
suggest higher costs and/or lower levels of effectiveness of voluntary versus
mandatory unemployment insurance. Empirically this is unconfirmed, as Table 2
demonstrates. In 2005, both the coverage ratio (share of the workforce included
in unemployment insurance) as well as recipient ratio (share of unemployed
in receipt of unemployment insurance benefits) were considerably higher
in Denmark and Sweden than in Germany or the UK, two countries with
compulsory unemployment insurance schemes. Differences in the latter are only
partially explained with shortermaximum entitlement periods in the non-Ghent
countries. If only claimants with a spell of unemployment below three months
are considered, the ratio of insurance benefit recipients was higher in Germany
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TABLE 2. Unemployment insurance systems compared, 2005
Denmark Sweden Germany UK
Type voluntary voluntary compulsory compulsory
Number of funds 32 37 1 1
Monthly membership
contribution (€) (1)
55 11 96 240 (12)
Net replacement rate (%) (2) 61 77 61 45
Maximum entitlement
period (3)
4 years 600 days 12/18 months 6 months
Coverage ratio (4) 83 85 68 86
Recipient ratio (%) (5) 85 85 47 20
Notes: all data for 2005 unless otherwise stated; (1) for Denmark and Sweden: membership
contribution plus average administration fee; Germany: 3.25% of an average gross wage paid
in industrial employment, (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005); UK: total National Insurance
contribution for somebody earning an average weekly full-time salary in the private sector (figure
in bracket represents contribution needed to fund expenditure on contributory JSA only); own
calculations based on DWP (2006) and HM Treasury (2006); (2) for single person, no children,
initial phase of unemployment, with previous wage of ‘average production worker’ in 2004
(OECD, 2006); (3) including ‘activation periods’ in Demark and Sweden; Germany: 18 months
for claimants over 55; (4) portion of the labour force covered by unemployment insurance,
2002, Scruggs (2007); (5) recipients of unemployment insurance as share of all unemployed; for
Germany: own calculation based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2005); for the UK: recipients of
contributory JSA (with and without other benefits) as a share of all unemployed benefit claimants,
February 2005 (DWP, 2006).
(around 60 per cent) and in the UK (about 30 per cent), but still well below
the rates in Denmark and Sweden. Other aspects, such as eligibility criteria, are
further explanatory factors here. What is more, voluntary unemployment insur-
ance can be at least as generous as compulsory systems and at the same time less
costly as far as direct costs of individual insured persons are concerned. Because
of the lack of earmarked fees and the existence of a general contribution to the
National Insurance Fund, calculating such cost is difficult for the UK. However,
direct unemployment insurance contributions in 2005 were certainly higher in
Germany than average membership fees in either Danish or Swedish voluntary
unemployment insurance funds, implying heavy tax subsidisation (see below).
In sum, from a macro perspective, the Danish and Swedish examples
illustrate that voluntary unemployment insurance can be more effective in social
policy terms than mandatory systems. The problem of adverse risk selection is
avoided by relatively generous benefits and low direct costs, both of which make
membership in voluntary funds attractive. However, the above does not explain
the individual preference for the, more expensive, option of entry in both the
unemployment insurance fund and the (linked) trade union. Elucidating the
reasons for this connection requires a closer look into major characteristics and
the operation of contemporary Danish and Swedish systems of unemployment
insurance. Referring to the situation in 2005, Table 3 provides a brief overview and
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TABLE 3. Major characteristics of voluntary unemployment insurance systems
in Denmark and Sweden, 2005 and relevant changes introduced in January 2007
in Sweden [in brackets and italics]
Denmark Sweden
Administration 32 separate funds, including one
non-trade union fund and three
‘open’ competition oriented
funds
37 separate funds [36 funds in 2007
due to the amalgamation of two
funds] linked to particular trade
union sector, one independent
fund
Membership Full-time and part-time employees;
persons with completed
academic or vocational training,
self-employed
Full-time employees, part-time
employees (with minimum of
17 hours per week);
self-employed; students [since
January 2007 this option no longer
applies]
Funding Standard membership fee across all
funds, plus variable contribution
to cover administrative costs; tax
subsidies (main revenue)
Small membership fee to cover
administrative costs, tax
subsidies (95%) from general
taxation and contributions from
employers and self-employed
[for 2007 membership fees are
expected to cover 46% of
unemployment insurance costs]
Generosity 90% of previous income up to a
monthly ceiling (pre tax) of DKK
14,170 (ca. €1900); minimum
benefit represents 82% of ceiling
80% of previous earnings up to a
daily ceiling of SEK 730 (ca. €79)
for the first 100 days of
unemployment and up to a daily
ceiling of SEK 680 (€73) for the
next 200 days [80% of previous
earnings up to a daily ceiling of
SEK 680 for the first 200 days of
unemployment, 70% of previous
income thereafter]
Entitlement Maximum of four years; after
12 month (or before) claimants
enter ‘activity period’
Maximum of 300 days; possible
extension in certain cases by
another 300 days
Conditions of
benefit eligibiliy
Membership in a fund of at least
12 months; 26 weeks employment
(full-time staff) or 34 weeks
(part-time) within the past
3 years; (special regulations
depending on vocational
qualification of job seeker)
Employment of at least 6 months,
working for at least 70 hours per
month [increased to at least 80
hours per month]; alternatively at
least 450 hours employment in
6 consecutive months (of at least
45 hours per month) [480 hours
during 6 consecutive months, with
at least 50 hours in each of the
months]
Waiting period none 5 days
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orientation for the subsequent discussion. The table also highlights significant
changes, which were introduced by the Swedish government with effect from
January 2007.
Administration and membership
First introduced in 1907, the Danish Ghent system of voluntary
unemployment insurance is currently administered by 32 separate funds (a-
kasser), all of which are governed by legislation, which stipulates common
criteria for benefit eligibility and entitlement, as well as job search requirements,
suitability of job offers and jobseekers’ availability for employment. The control
over a-kasser is exercised by the Arbejdsdirektoratet, a section within the Ministry
of Labour. A major reform in 1969 circumscribed the remit of the sector-
specific unemployment insurance funds, formally transferring their previous
role in job placement activities to newly created public employment offices
(Arbejdsformidlingen; AF) operating across all industries. Moreover, the option
of charging up to 40 per cent higher membership fees from members who were
not affiliated to the relevant trade union was abolished (Nørgaard, 1997: 333).
The minimum number of members required to gain recognition by the state was
increased (initially to 1,000, later to 5,000 and eventually to 10,000; Nørgaard,
1997: 340; Lind, 2001: 117). In return, eligibility conditions were relaxed, benefit
generosity improved, and the level of tax subsidies rose significantly. During
the 1970s, the coverage of unemployment insurance was widened to part-time
workers as well as self-employed people.
Apart from two funds for self-employed persons, the structure of
unemployment insurance reflects the Danish trade union structure, which
differentiates between blue- and white-collar employees, as well as educational
and vocational grades achieved. A majority of the numerous trade unions are
affiliated to one of the three umbrella organisations: the Landsorganisationen
(LO) (for blue- and white-collar workers in the private and public sector), the
Akademikernes Centralorganisation (AC) (professional association for employees
with a university degree) or the Funktionærernes og Tjenestemændenes Fællesra˚d
(FTF) (for white-collar workers in the public sector). Traditionally linked to
the Danish social-democratic party, the LO is the largest organisation with
more than half of all trade union members affiliated (Lind, 2001). Employees
with a particular occupational or educational background tend to join the
unemployment insurance fund linked to the corresponding trade union. In
principle, it has long been possible to join a fund that operates across sectors.
However, exercising this choice has, until recently, been limited to the Christian
unemployment insurance fund, which has traditionally recruited members who
do not identify themselves with the trade unionmovement. Twenty years ago the
membership of this fund consisted ofmerely 30,000 persons, but has since grown
to almost 160,000, equivalent to 7 per cent of all insured persons, thereby making
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it the fourth largest single fund in Denmark (Arbejdsdirektoratet, 2005). After a
legislative change in 2002, another three funds began to make use of the newly
created option of recruitingmembers irrespective of their particular employment
or educational background. In contrast to the majority of a-kasser, these three
funds are actively engaged in publicising their services, aiming to recruit new
members as well as tempting members from other funds with the prospect of
lower membership fees (see below).
Since 2002, the membership of these competition oriented funds has
increased. However, including the Christian fund, these four ‘open’ funds cover
only about 15 per cent of the total membership in Denmark, despite membership
fees that are about four times lower than those of the most expensive funds
(Arbejdsdirektoratet, 2005). There is little indication that many more funds will
decide to ‘open up’ and thereby breach the informal consensus among the large
majority of funds that have ignored the option of recruiting members outside
of their traditional industrial or occupational remit, thereby respecting and
safeguarding traditional tradeuniondemarcations. In short, the legislation aimed
at stimulating more competition between funds has had only modest success.
In Sweden a major reform in 1974 supplemented the existing voluntary
unemployment insurance systemwith a general tax-fundedunemployment assis-
tance (kontanta arbetsmarknadssto¨d, KAS) for thosewhowere eithernotmembers
of one of the trade union-affiliated unemployment funds or did not fulfil the
entitlement conditions. Benefits, however, were much lower than offered by un-
employment insurance, and the entitlement periodwas relatively short. Usually it
was groups at the margins of the labour market who only received this lower un-
employment assistance: that is, those typically less unionised, such as women and
young workers, than the male skilled workers (Bjo¨rklund and Holmlund, 1991:
123). As part of a far-reaching reform in 1997, this schemewas eventually abolished
and replaced with a basic income security allowance, which covers all workers
who have been in paid employment for a certain minimum period. The level of
this basic allowance is considerably lower than unemployment insurance benefit.
The Swedish voluntary unemployment insurance system (officially termed
earnings-replacement insurance) is runby 36 funds,which, similar to theirDanish
counterparts, have a private status. As in Denmark, legislation requires funds
to have at least 10,000 members and the funds need to be officially registered
with the National Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS). The
AMS stipulates uniform regulations (eligibility criteria, entitlement, benefit
levels and so on) and, until the end of 2003, was responsible for supervising
the unemployment funds, a task which has since been transferred to the IAF
(Unemployment Insurance Board). While the funds establish whether claimants
have fulfilled eligibility conditions and distribute insurance benefits, it is the IAF
that determines the continuous benefit status on the part of jobseekers, such as
regular renewal procedures.
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Although formally independent, funds cooperate closely with particular
trade unions and thus cover the same industrial sector as the relevant trade union.
As in Denmark, trade unions are affiliated to one of the three confederations LO
(blue-collar), TCO (white-collar) or SACO (academic). The LO has the closest
links to the Social Democratic Party, whereas the other two confederations are
politically more independent (Kjellberg, 2006). The occupational area or type of
employment determines which fund can be joined. In the case of a job change, it
is possible to change funds and existing entitlements are transferred.Membership
in a fund is open to all employees, as well as to employers and, under certain
conditions, until 2006 to students (see Table 3).
Although it has long been possible to be a member of a fund without
joining the respective union, in practice almost all insured persons are also
trade union members. However, in 1998 the formal separation between trade
unions and unemployment insurance became more strongly accentuated with
the introduction of the independent ‘Alfa’ fund (Alfa-Kassan). Unlike the trade
union-affiliated unemployment insurance funds, its membership is open to the
workforce across all sectors and occupations. However, its alternative status
might be seen as being undermined by the fact that it is administered by
the federation of the trade union-affiliated unemployment insurance funds.
Although membership in the ‘Alfa’-fund has grown considerably in recent years
(from 66,000 persons in December 2004 to 86,000 two years later: IAF, 2007), it
has remained small in the context of a total of 3.8 million members of voluntary
unemployment insurance funds in Sweden. What is more, its fee is somewhat
higher than in most other funds, due to its higher administrative costs per
unemployed person (IAF, 2005). In turn, this is linked to the fact that a large
proportion of the members of the ‘Alfa’ fund are eligible only for the basic
security benefit. In 2004, the ‘Alfa’ fund dealt with 76 per cent of the total of all
entitlement days to this basic component within unemployment insurance.
Similar to the situation in Denmark, the competitive element of Swedish
unemployment insurance is potentially to become stronger, as a result of
significantly higher differences in membership fees introduced in 2007 (see
below).Tradeunionmembers can remain in their oldunionbutbecomemembers
of cheaper alternative funds as long as they fulfil the occupational criteria for these
funds. This is especially important for TCO-affiliated unions, which often have
rivals in SACO-affiliated unions. We might thus expect changes both in trade
union membership as a whole and in the relative strength of SACO and TCO in
particular.
Funding and benefits
Unemployment insurance in both countries is funded by tax subsidies and
individual membership fees, which can be set against personal tax. Disregarding
a small annual duty to be paid for a public second pension (of DKK 144, or €19),
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in 2005 Danish membership in voluntary unemployment insurance comprised
of a uniform annual insurance fee of DKK 3144 (€420) and an administrative fee,
which ranged from DKK 624 (€86) in the least expensive to DKK 2748 (€368) in
the most expensive fund. These differences in administrative fees reflect different
costs, which are determined by the distribution of the risk of unemployment
across funds and the structure of unemployment within the membership of a
particular fund.Totalmembership is another factor since it influences thenumber
of regional and local branches of a particular fund.
As a form of revenue, membership fees are less relevant than tax subsidies
stemming from both general taxation and a hypothecated labour market tax of
8 per cent of gross earnings levied on all economically active persons. Moreover,
while membership fees vary little from year to year, the share of expenditure
covered by tax subsidies reflects changes in the level of unemployment since
the latter determines total benefit expenditure. However, even at times of low
unemployment, the bulk of the funding for unemployment insurance is tax
financed and direct personal contributions are relatively low, which implies a
strong individual incentive to join an unemployment insurance fund. Benefit
generosity enhances this since transfers nominally replace 90 per cent of previous
earnings. However, benefit income is taxed and a ceiling applies that means the
actual replacement rate for all but those on previously very low earnings is well
below 90 per cent (OECD, 2004; see also Table 2). Moreover, although nominally
linked todevelopments in average earnings, for several years thebenefit ceilinghas
not been fully uprated, thereby widening the gap between average earnings and
the maximum benefit obtainable. While in 1994 the maximum unemployment
benefit was equivalent to 66 per cent of average wages, by 2001 it had declined to
63 per cent (Hansen, 2003: 12).
However, there is a second type of incomemaintenance, whichmakes joining
a Danish unemployment insurance fund highly appealing. In Denmark a-kasser
administer not only unemployment insurance benefits but also a voluntary early
retirement allowance (efterløn), which was originally introduced in 1979 in order
to address mass unemployment with improved options for labour market exit.
Unemployment insurance funds weremade responsible for running efterløn, and
eligibility became thus linked to membership in a fund. Moreover, initially there
were no additional charges over and above the usual membership fee.
The importance of efterløn for unemployment insurance funds can be
illustrated with a regulatory change introduced in 1992, which doubled the
number of insurance years required for accessing the early retirement scheme.
It also stipulated that, at the time of the prospective entry into early retirement,
a minimum fund membership of 20 years (now 25 years) within the previous
25 (now 30) years would be required. In 1992, this rule applied particularly
to employees below and around 45 years of age. Intent on safeguarding the
chance of receiving the early retirement allowance, it was this age group that
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disproportionately joined unemployment insurance funds prior to the new law
coming into effect (Parsons et al., 2003: 38).
Despite having made access somewhat more difficult in the early 1990s,
efterløn maintained its role as a major route into retirement in Denmark. At any
one point during the 1990s, about two-thirds of all members in unemployment
insurance funds aged between 60 and 66were in receipt of the allowance (Parsons
et al., 2003), and today the fiscal scope of efterløn is larger than unemployment
insurance. In 2004, insurance funds paid a total of about DKK 22.8 billion in
unemployment benefit, but DKK 25 billion on efterløn (Politiken, 11 November
2005). This is remarkable since several changes introduced in 1999 were aimed at
making the scheme less attractive. Since then, moreover, separate contributions
have been payable, making it possible for members of unemployment insurance
funds to choose only the less expensive option of unemployment insurance cover,
rather than the package that includes efterløn. Recent data suggest that the reform
has had some success, given that the ratio of younger members in a-kasser who
select also to pay efterløn contributions has significantly declined (Bredgaard and
Larsen, 2005: 320).
There is no equivalent to unemployment funds running a similar system in
Sweden. However, from the perspective of personal cost, the financial incentive
to join a Swedish unemployment fund was, until recently, even greater than in
Denmark, since membership fees were comprised of merely a small state levy
and an administrative contribution which in 2005 was just €11 per month on
average, and thus well below average contributions payable in Denmark (see
Table 2). Moreover, until recently membership fees in Sweden varied much less
across funds than in Denmark.3 The low level of membership fees imply that,
with 90–95 per cent of total expenditure, the Swedish system before 2007 was
evenmore tax funded than the Danish system (Engblom, 2005; Lundgren, 2006).
From an individual perspective, a simple cost–benefit calculation made it thus
highly rational for Swedish employees to join an unemployment insurance fund
(Hatland, 1998). The financial savings fromnon-membership are small and it can
be assumed that only individuals with a very low risk of unemployment, such as
tenured civil servants, decide against joining an unemployment insurance fund.
It is thus no surprise that the coverage is even slightly higher than in Denmark
(see Table 2).
However, with the intention of weakening the attractiveness of voluntary
trade union unemployment insurance, a number of significant changes have
been introduced by the new centre-right coalition, which won the Swedish
election in September 2006.4 For example, conditions of eligibility have been
tightened and benefit levels lowered (see Table 3). The most important change,
though, is the steep increase in membership fees, shifting total funding heavily
away from taxation. Whereas in 2004 contributions represented 9.4 per cent
of unemployment benefit outlays (Lundgren, 2006: 2), for 2007 membership
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fees are forecast, covering 46 per cent of total costs.5 This has been achieved
by raising the average monthly unemployment insurance contribution more
than threefold from about SEK 100 (€11) to SEK 352 (€38). Another novelty is
that unemployment insurance contributions varied more strongly in line with
different unemployment rates of members in a particular fund. Whereas in 2005
insurance contributions ranged from SEK 84 (€9) in the cheapest fund to SEK
240 (€26) in the most expensive, in 2007 contributions varied between SEK
311 (€34) and SEK 656 (€71). This means that the new system as a whole, and
some funds in particular, have become financially less attractive than before.
One early consequence of this was a steep decline of about 6 per cent (210,000
persons) in total membership within unemployment insurance funds by April
2007 (EIROnline 2007).
In sum, due to the way the systems are designed, there are clear incentives
for joining a voluntary unemployment insurance system in both Denmark and
Sweden. In both countries, the level of individual fees (which can be set against
personal income tax) is relatively low and the level of benefit support relatively
high, especially for average and below-average wage earners. Legislative changes
introduced recently in Sweden have certainly weakened the financial attraction
of joining an unemployment fund compared to the situation before 2007, and
there are indications of a significant drop in membership, which might cast
some doubt on the sustainability of the system in the medium term (see below).
However, before we discuss this issue, further aspects of the Danish and Swedish
Ghent system have to be addressed that help to explain why the membership
in an unemployment insurance fund is generally coupled with simultaneous
membership in a trade union.
Voluntary unemployment insurance – still a recruitment tool for
trade unions in Nordic countries
Supported by social surveys in both Sweden and Denmark, unemployment
insurance cover is widely considered a major, if not the most important, factor
for joining a trade union (for example, Lind, 2004; Jørgensen, 2002; Timonen,
2003). However, the reasons which make the more expensive option of a dual
membership more appealing than the cheaper option of merely joining an
unemployment fund but not a trade union cannot be gauged from such surveys.
In this section we identify two of those aspects which apply to both countries
(identification with the trade union movement and institutional linkages), as
well as two country-specific factors: active labour market support in Denmark
and additional unemployment benefit cover in Sweden.
The traditionally strong and widespread identification with the trade union
movement in both countries is certainly a factor that explains the popularity
of a dual membership in both countries. Merely becoming a member of an
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unemployment insurance fund but not the respective trade union might be
regarded as a sign of disloyalty towards fellow employees and their representation
in the local workplace. However, a related and reinforcing second reason is
a widely held perception that, despite a legal and formal separation between
the two organisations, unemployment insurance cover is conditional upon
trade union membership (see also Hatland, 1998). In recent years, Danish
governments have aimed to create more transparency in this respect: that
is, by encouraging members to switch between funds. However, as discussed
earlier, anxious not to undermine traditional trade union demarcations, all
but a few Danish funds have refrained from the option of recruiting members
from other sectors, thereby perpetuating the perception that unemployment
insurance funds and respective trade unions are closely linked. In addition,
the formal separation between trade union and insurance fund at local level
is undermined by the fact that, according to interviews in Denmark, it is not
uncommon for individual personnel to work part-time in both organisations,
which are often located within the same building. Dealing with staff who divide
their working time between unemployment insurance fund and trade union
can thus be regarded as another factor that contributes to a view of two closely
linked organisations, despite a formal disconnection and separate membership
fees. According to Kjellberg (2006: 96), the formal separation between the two
organisations in Sweden has not been widely understood either, and trade union
membership is widely perceived as a prerequisite for access to an unemployment
fund.
In addition to the absence of a clear institutional separation, there are
country-specific reasons for dualmembership,which aremore directly associated
with individual interests. In Denmark this applies to access to employment
services; in Sweden to the prospect of better unemployment cover. As discussed
above, a reform in 1969 created a structure in which Danish funds retained the
responsibility for unemployment insurance, whereas the newly created public
employment offices (AF) were put in charge of active labour market policy.
However, this division remained somewhat insubstantial since unemployment
insurance funds, and especially those linked to the LO-affiliated trade unions,
maintained their active role as job brokers. Moreover, since their job placement
rates were generally superior to those of the AF, unemployment insurance funds
remained pivotal for job seekers. Eventually this situation led to the abolition
of the AF’s formal monopoly in job placement in the late 1980s and the de facto
acknowledgement of the role of the a-kasser in the field of active labour market
policy. As discussed, currently a-kasser offer their members a range of services
aimedat job reintegration, suchas informationonvacancies and trainingoptions,
counselling and general support with job search. It is noticeable that funds which
closely collaborate with trade unions for semi-skilled and unskilled workers are
particularly active in job-search services.6 An important point here is the fact
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that some unemployment insurance funds offer these services in conjunction
with the relevant trade union. Moreover, at local level there are often close
contacts between a-kasser, the relevant trade union and employers in a particular
sector of industry. The chance of a rapid reintegration into the labour market is
thus higher, or perceived to be higher, for job seekers who are also trade union
members.
In Sweden, active labour market services are not offered by unemployment
insurance funds,which exclusively administer unemployment insurance benefits.
Instead, public employment offices are in charge of job placement and job search
assistance, while advice on benefit receipt or other relevant information for job
seekers is offered by relevant trade unions directly. However, for many members
of unemployment insurance funds, a simultaneous trade union affiliation
has an important material impact in case of unemployment. As discussed,
unemployment insurance benefits in Sweden are capped with a ceiling that is
relatively low. Moreover, unlike regular indexation as in Denmark, this ceiling
(as well as benefit floor) is adjusted by the government on a discretionary basis at
irregular intervals. As a result, benefits for a growing share of unemployed people
remain well below the nominal 80 per cent replacement rate. In 2003, the average
replacement rate was 63 per cent of previous earnings (IAF, 2005), and around
45 per cent of those eligible for the income-related benefits did not receive the
stipulated 80 per cent compensation level in 2005 (Lundgren, 2006).
As a consequence, over time several schemes have developed and become
increasingly relevant as a top-up to public unemployment insurance support (for
an excellent overview, see Sjo¨gren Lindquist andWadensjo¨, 2006). These include
severance pay agreements, whichmainly benefit people over the age of 40, as well
as amultitude of ‘collective agreement-based insurance cover’, which top up state
benefits generally to 80 per cent of previous individual earnings. The exact design
of the latter varies across occupations and industries, but such arrangements are
common within both the public and private sectors. A third scheme applies
exclusively to trade union members. In 2005, several SACO unions and two TCO
unions offered their members ‘collective insurance cover’ as part of their total
trade union membership package. Providing income supplement in addition
to public unemployment insurance benefits for between 100 and 120 days, this
cover is normally funded out of slightly raised standard trade union fees. Finally,
linking up with commercial insurance companies, some trade unions offer
their members the option of purchasing supplementary individual insurance
policies, providing benefit for a prolonged period of unemployment. Having
become rather widespread in recent years (Engblom, 2005; Sjo¨gren Lindquist
and Wadensjo¨, 2006), the point to note here is that collective additional cover
provided by trade unions is conditional on simultaneous membership in the
relevant unemployment insurance fund, a fact which certainly nurtures the link
between the Ghent system and Swedish trade unions.
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Conclusion
The discussion has shown that the voluntary Ghent system can be more effective
in social policy terms (coverage and degree of social protection) than mandatory
public unemployment protection. High levels of membership in unemployment
insurance in Denmark and Sweden can be explained with reference to low
direct personal costs and relatively high benefits in case of unemployment.
Moreover, there are several factors that favour the simultaneous membership
in unemployment insurance and trade union. The identification with the trade
union movement suggests membership in the unemployment insurance fund
close to the corresponding trade union. The post-tax financial costs of a dual
membership are relatively low, but have recently risen in Sweden. Third, the
formal separation between trade union and unemployment insurance does not
always correspond with public perceptions of unemployment insurance as a
component of the total benefit package gained by joining a trade union. Finally,
many unionised job seekers have the advantage of potentially more effective
job search support in Denmark and access to additional transfer income during
periods of unemployment in Sweden.
Do these factors suggest that voluntary unemployment insurance is likely
to remain a characteristic feature of Nordic welfare states in the medium term?
Currently, the answer to this question seems to us, on balance, affirmative in
the Danish case but more uncertain for Sweden in the light of recent changes.
Certainly, political threats to theGhent systemcanbe identified in both countries.
Arguably, in Denmark these include the decline in value of the benefit ceiling,
the expansion of private unemployment insurance or the government’s attempt
to significantly lower the generosity of unemployment support in September
2003. However, with 3 per cent of all employees, the scope for additional private
unemployment insurance has remained rather small. Moreover, the fact that it
is the trade unions that are the providers of additional private unemployment
cover – offered to their members as long as they belong to an unemployment
fund – strengthens the system rather than erodes it. Finally, ever since the
ill-fated attempt to reduce the level of benefits for the unemployed, which
was uniformly criticised by trade unions and employer organisations alike, the
conservative-liberal government has adopted a much more balanced position.
While emphasising the need to increase competition between funds, the system
of voluntary unemployment insurance is now portrayed as an important element
within theDanishmodel of ‘flexicurity’ (Madsen, 2006), which combines flexible
labour markets, generous unemployment support and a strong emphasis on
activation. At least for the time being, the Danish government has been anxious
to promote this model as a way of maintaining economic competitiveness.
A prediction for Sweden seems rather more difficult. Certainly, the changes
implemented in early 2007 have made the system less attractive. An even greater
variation between membership fees across funds might foster a competitive
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situation, with employees breaking with the convention of joining the fund
closest to their occupation or qualification, engaging in ‘shopping around’ for
best deals. However, it is equally possible that developments will be similar
to those in Denmark, where the system adapted to the option of becoming
more market-based, with trade unions, by and large, finding ways of avoiding
competition. Perhaps more seriously, the government plans to implement a
compulsory unemployment insurance fund by 2008, which is strongly opposed
by both social partners as well as the parliamentary left (EIROnline, 2007). If the
government succeeds, traditional structures of the Swedish Ghent system will
change dramatically, making the end of the system conceivable, which, in turn,
would have serious repercussions for the strength of Swedish trade unions.
Notes
1 The article is based on a study into the Ghent system of unemployment insurance funded
by the German Hans Bo¨ckler Foundation. We would like to thank the Foundation for their
support.Wewould also like to thankour interviewpartners inDenmark andSweden for their
useful information, and Samuel Engblom for an update on the current Swedish situation.
2 Belgium is a special case. Unemployment insurance is no longer voluntary but trade unions
have maintained a large role in benefit provision.
3 One reason why unemployment insurance funds in Sweden are less expensive than their
Danish counterparts is their lower average administrative costs as a result of a common
IT system. Separate systems in Denmark make total IT costs about ten times as high as in
Sweden.
4 Inter alia the government proposed that tax deductions for trade union membership fees
and contributions to unemployment insurance funds should be cancelled.
5 See http://www.samorg.org/so/Index.aspx?id=136, accessed 3 August 2007.
6 AK-Samvirke, the Danish umbrella organisation of unemployment insurance funds,
provides a very informative overview of the respective structures and list of services offered
by (almost) all unemployment funds (see http://www.ak-samvirke.dk/).
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